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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

EMPLOYERS MUTUAL LIABILITY
INSURANCE COMP ANY OF
WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

Case
No.10921

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
OF UTAH, ET AL
Defend amt.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a review of proceedings before the Industrial Commission of Utah culminating in an order by
the Commission that Plaintiff pay benefits as provided
li>· the Utah Workmen's Compensation Act by reason
of fatal injury sustained by Phillip H. Russon on .Januar>· 19, 1966, in the course of his employment with A-1
Qnalit,v Glass Co., herein called A-1.
1

STATE:MEX'l1 OF FACTR
There is no question as to the employment status of
the deceased ( i. e. he was an emplo~'ee of A-1) or as to
his having been in the course of his employment ·when
fatally injured 011 .Jmmary 1!1, 1966. The on1~, isslw relates to coverage, it being Plai11tiff 's e011te11tio11 that
the compensation policy on which Plaintiff's responsihilit~r must he predicated was validly eance11ed for statutory reasons and in statutol'y manner hefon' the aeei<lP11t.
Sometime prior to October 19, 1965, A-1 l'equestc<1
Plaintiff to recalculate the premium ($422.0;3) \\-hich had
been hilled for the policy year beginning Septemlwr 2G,
1965 (R-30, 84). On October 19, 1965, Plaintiff sent
~i-1 an amended billing (R-82) which shows a $161.15
premium reduction base<l on employee reclassification and
1111 "mnonnt dne" of $260.90 ( i. e. the $422.05 origillall~' hilled less the $161.15 Cl'eclit for reclassificatio11
reduction).
On December 3, 1965, Plaintiff, having by the11 received no part of the pl'eminm even as rNlucP<l, mailed
notices of caneellation (R-91) to A-1 and th0 Commission's Compensation Division. 'fl1ere is some question,
since the Commission's stamping is defective (R-72)
about when the Commission's copy was received, but it
was certainly received by December 15, 1965 (R-78).
1,here is no question about when A-1 received its notice>.
:\[rs. Horton of A-1 signed a r0ceipt on Decemlwr 7,
1965 (R-55) and dispatched a check in the amom1t of
$161.15 ($99.75 less than the premium due) on December
8, 1966 ( R-87).
2

On December 30, 1965 (15 clays before the end
of the statutor.'T :30-cla)T period which must expin•
after notice of cancellation before the cancellation can
hC' effective) Plaintiff sent A-1 a statement of account
showing the amount which remained to be paid in ordt-r
tn rei11state the polic~v (R-88). Previously (R-56) Mr.
Larson had telephoned Mrs. Horton and advisefl her that
the payment of December 8, 1965 was defirient, and an
additional $99.75 would have to be sent to ''reinstate
the policy." By .January 14, 1966 ("when 30 clays after
the effective date of the notice of cancellation, as stated
on its fare, had elapsed), no additional payment had
lwc•11 made. A-1 cli<l send Plaintiff a rheck for $99.7:i
aftn the fatal accident of January 19, 1966. The rheek
was clatNl .January 30 and received by Plaintiff, as indicated by the time stamp on the back, on February 21.
rrhe $161.15 payment was neYer returned to A-1 because
:Tear-encl audit revealed that A-1 was more than $161.1:5
in arrears on its 1964-65 premium (R-93).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff seeks an order of this Court annn1ling the
award herein as against Plaintiff and declaring the Commission's finding that A-1 had compensation co\Teragc
with Plaintiff on January 19, 1967, to be against the law
and the evidence.

ARGUl\IENT
POINT I
PLAINTIFF MORE THAN CO~IPLIED \YITR
THE LETTER OF THE LAW IN EFFECTING THE CANCELLATION OF THE POLICY
HEREIN. THERE ARE NO EQUITABLE
PRINCIPLES WHICH SHOULD APPLY TO
VITIATE THE CANCELLATION.

It should be noted at the outset that there is no qne8tion about Wendy Russon 's being entitled to receive the
benefits our compensation act provides for surviving dependents. The only issue is whether those benefits should
be paid by A-1 or Plaintiff. The principle that the compensation act should be liberally construed for workmen
has no application to the contest between these corporations.
The compensation act imposes direct responsibility
on employers, not on insurance carriers. Section 35-1-46
UCA requires every employer to secure ('Ompensation
to its employees "by insuring and keeping insured."
The statutes do give an employer ample protection
against the possibility that its coverage will expire without its knowledge. Section 31-19-14 permits canc<>llation only for nonpayment of premium and then only llJJOll
30 days written notice by the carrier to the employer aml
the Commission.
The statutes (31-19-14) require every authorized
compensation carrier to accept every application for
compensation coverage made to it. They do not, how4

eyer, require that the other customers of an authorized
carrier must assume the ohlig-ations of an emp]o>rrr who
mnkrs application an<l refuses to pay premiums. Thr
hnsic concept of insnrancr is that all of the insured assnme the risk of each of the insured hy contrihuting to
a common fnn<l. Thr onC' who fails to contrihute must
lose his protection. Carriers are therefore given by
statute a means of cancelling the polic>r of an insured who
"·i11 not pay premiums.
In the instant case, Plaintiff more than complied
with the letter and spirit of the act. It orig-ina1ly hillr<l
for 1965-66 premiums on Sept. 25, 1965. When question -vrns raised as to the amount of the premium, plaintiff reYiewe<l the work history of A-1 's employees, rrf']assified them and hilled again, at the reduced ratr, on
October 19, 1965. A-1 faile<l to pay even the reduced
premium hy Decemher 3, 1965, so Plaintiff resorted to
tlw statutory procedure for extricating itself and consprnng its reserves for those who had contributed to
them.
Plaintiff did more than give 30 <fa>rs noticr of cance]hition. On Decemher 3, it mailed a notice which had
an effectivre <late of December 15, and thus commenced
on Decemher 15 the 30-day perio<l during which the
premium had to he paid to reinstate the policy. A-1 still
f ailerl to pay the premium: it paid only about 60% of
the nmount due. Before Christmas, Mr. Larson advised
A-1 h>- telephone that the remainder must be paid (R-56).
011 D0cemher ~O, Plaintiff sent A-1 a final premium stat<:'mPnt clearly expressing the premium deficienr>r (R-88).

..:\-1 failed to 1·es11orn1.

.Tamrn1·v
. l-1- (t]1(' 1hirtif'tli <LIY.
after the• effect iv<> <late of the notie<>) earn<> and ·went. The
<·a11c·pflatirm 1.i:as statutorily Pjf P('f Prl.
Then• is no prineiple of 0qnit)' ·whi(·h should appl~·
to excuse an employer from failur<> to satisf)· its statutory ohligation nnder the circnmstanc<>s of this ras<>.
"fore than statutory notice was gin.•n. Telepho1w enm.
munication heyoml statutory demand ·was initiatPd h~·
Plaintiff so that A-1 would he fully appriserl of tlw c·o11sequenccs of its continuing failnr<>. To impose rdilig;i.
tion on the insurance carrier under these cirrnmstarwc"
indicates a misapprehension as to the sonrre of insuranf'r
company funds.
POINT II
PART PA Y'.\fEXT OF PRE'.\TIF-:\f DOES XOT
REINSTATE AX IXSrRAXCE POLICY.

We would emphasize at the outset that most of th1•
easPs li0n•in rite<l i11volYe life insuranc<> polic:· forf0itnrc«
n11<l01· eirrnmstances ,,·here> the law n•C'og-niz<><;; tl1<' i11;;;111·pi]
to he under a clisach·antage. The insurer design<;; the provisions of the insuranc0 polic:· which ma:· he almost m1i11tellig-ihle to the insurecl. The insurer is a giant eorporntion and the insured may he a totall:· nnedncatec1. enn
illiterate, indiYidual. The 1wo,·isions for forfeiture an•
often contained in the contract onl:·, there heing no statntory protection for the insured, and may work a forfeiture without notice or grace period.
The doctrines of these cases apply. we helie\C', ,,·ith
much greater force in the instant <:itnation "·1wre tl1P

<' 11t i ty

asst•1·t ing roverage is itself a corpora ti on of some
l'ize, has a statutory ohligation to maintain coverage
:rncl is protected against any possihilit)r that a forfeiture
will occur without its knowlec1ge h>r a statutory pro,·ision that 30 days' notire of forfeiture must he giYen.
'l'he po1i<7 is a standan1 rom1wnsation policy, (then' can
lip no contention that it was treacherously designed by
the rarrier) arnl the parties to the insurance contract
are essentially equals. The significant differenre between the instant situation and the usual insurance situation is simply this: Here, the law (Section 46) im11nsrs on tlie insured an obligation to ins11rp nnrl kerr1
i11s11rrrl and, inferentially, to he aware of the performm1ce necessary to satisfy that ohligation and the conse<JlWnres of failure. The onus is not placed on insurance
i'Ompanies b)r the legislature, it is placed on employers.
Tlte issue we see in this case is one \d1ich freqnently
nrises. Couch comments on the specific situation which
r011fronts ns and cites numerous cases in support of his
eonclusions. In quoting, we retain the footnote numbers
from the original text to indicate the depth of the author's research. "\Ve do not, however, include the
author's footnotes. At page 331 of Volume 6, Conch on
Insurance 2nd, the following statement appears as a part
of Section 32.111:
"The ohligation to pn:· the premium when <hw
is ordinarily nn indivisihle obligation to pay the
entire premium, so that a forfeiture is not prevented by part payment tlwreof :5 This means that
a part payment will not keep the poli<7 in force
for even such a proportionate part of the m•w
7

JH•riod as th<' snm hears to the \\-hole prrmiurn
rhw. 6
Tht> pnrtif's ma~- nf ronrse agT<'P tlrnt tlir insnrrr shn 11 accrpt thr p:cnt rrn~-m0nt as effectiw
to kf'<'P the polic~· in forcr for th0 lWrio<l co\-Pl'Pd
h~- the fnll ]We>minm which was (hW. 7 \Vherp rrnrt
pa~-ment is ten<lerrd, the iw;nrer ma~· acrept snrli
pa~·nwnt. resen·ing- tlw rig-ht to forf<:.it the poliry
if th<> hala11r0 is 110t pai<l, partirnlarly where m;_
tice is g-in•n limiting- tl1e time of riayment of th(·
balance.' ' 8
The standard reference \\-orks take the same position with reference to thr effect of a partial payment of
premium. The Corpus .Juris statement ( 45 C.TS 195, Insurance, Section 473 ( 5)) is as follows:

"In the ahsrnce of an ag-reement to the contrary,

a partial payment of a pr<>mium dne Rt a p::1rtir11lar time is of no effrct. So, where, under the trrms
of a premium not<", thr compan~- is entitl<>d to rnllert premiums as far as Parned, the acr0nb11r0 n+'
R pa~·ment on the note which is less tlrnn tliP
earne>d premium at the time the policy is forfeited
will not keep the policy alive."
The American .Jurisprudence comment is Section fi09
of the Insurance treatise (29 Am . .Jur. 825). There is an
annotation at 92 ALR 712.
The general proposition that a part payment of premium, even if retained pending payment of the l1::1la11(' 1'
before forfeiture date, does not reactivate a policy is \\'(•il
entrenched in onr case. The U. S. Supreme Conrt 11:1,
itself expressed this view in 87 ncum Y. N ('11' r nrk T, ifi
lnsura.nre Co., 228 U.S. 364, 33 S. Ct. 523. In Yo111u1'

8

,l!ufual Trust Lifr Insurance Cornpany, :>4 N.D. GOO; ~10
"'J..W. 177; 53 A.L.R. 910, the defendant compa11y rPtailll'd
n di,-id<'rnl, which was less than the amount of a JH"Prninrn
installment due, beyond the grace period. Dmi ng t 111•
grace period, the insured had indicated his desire' tl1at
the dividend he applied against the premium.
pa11~-

Tlw c•om-

therefore held money of the insured whieh eorndi-

tnted a part payment of the dividend hy their m11111al m1-

N e\'ertheless, said the Court, fail11rp 1o
the balance "\\'ithin the garce period work<'cl a for-

derstancling.
pa~·

feiture of the policy; there was no pro rat a oxfom1ion.

In the fielrl of compensation i11suran<'e, the N<'w York
Supreme Court ~-\ ppelJate DiYision very rN'PTJt ly (A pri I,
] 0fi4) comiderecl a case where the carri<ff had r<'<'Pivc•d
foll pa:-rnent of the current ~·ear'~ premium, hut the• i11-.;merl harl failerl to respond to a demand for a $48.GO prPminm ,_1pfir·ir:ncy for the previorn; year n~w~al<~d hy 11 y1~11 renrl na:n-r,J1 a1Flit. Tn Taylr;r "· 1765 - 176.'1 Reofty OorJJ.,
~+~ ~~.Y. ~1J[Jf1. 2nr1 92Fi. it was h<~ld that a 1·arw<dl11f ion
ha:'Pd r.·u fa:!'Jr1> tr1 fJay that pr<~viomi y<~ar'f.1 pn•mium dl'f!r·jr,u: -.:-3;; c.::c.r·t'.·.-·~· .\ ;;jmilar r<~sult, upholrlinl.(' 1·1111
(·pllatir·l~ i:c •!:.i; :ar-r: r1f r'.hiim,~<1 fJart rmym,·n1 of fll'I'·
mi um. --...-&' rc.ar:!:.i::<] jn r; rtc:r;yr,:-· \'. P'?rt~z /r{)n Wor/r.'i, I 7<i
~ro. ::?2_1] :::r~.
J-:;:J~. 19f;:i).
,y,. hav<~ found Tl" r·mwH
11h.:.~·-:c >:_ • "12 !;h!IlF:!.~ rJf f1r,:miurn <~Xf,~rHJi.; II polj,•y
•<F·.:.: • c-:_ .:.:'.".:. . ~-.'.; ~ ~1r/ ~ r7 ~ f.i':r:i f ir·:tJI y prr1 V jrJ <•H f' IJr j f. (II H j f
.Jr,.:.~

,-" ':..•.:.

rJ:'."'

-.:.[.r:-r<:

•he:

'•

<:l<:Tfl':TJf.ri.

,,f

'~~f11p111·l 111'1'

POINT III
THE ~Ll<~?\fENTR OF ERTOPPEL ARE NOT
PREREN"T HERE.
ThP onl~T comlnet of the Plaintiff in thiR caRe to
which A-1 haR pointed as an indication of Plaintiff':-;:
willingness to waive any right to fnl1 payment aml to extend credit for unpaid preminm ha1ancr is the tranRmittal of the December 30th statement. A-1 contendR that
Romehow, h~T giving a final written reminder that additional prrminm was due, Plaintiff ·waiv0d its right to
terminate coverage on .T anuary 14, the end of the grar-C>
period, if th<> premium balance was not so01wr forthcoming. The m0re sending of a Rtatement during thr
gr::.c0 p0riod can hardly he intNpreted as a waiver or
promisC' to Pxtrnd credit. In Rllerbrck v. Conth1r11fo1
Ca.c;11alt11 Cnmpa1111. 63 U. 530; 227 Pac. 805, this Conrt
had orrn.c.;ion to comment on the argument that the sending of sh\ tern en ts constituted a representation that cr0dit
was being extended. The Court disposed of tlw argnme11i
with this language:

"It cannot he reaRonahly contrnc1e(1 tlint t1w men'
sending of RtatementR 011 thP first of Parh mo11th
for 2 months nft0r the payment waR dne was Rnch
n rerognition of thr PxiRtenre of t1w insnr:rnc<'
m1(1 waiYer of payment that the i101icy remainr(1
in force an i11(1efinite time aftC>r thr date of Rrrn1irn~ the 1n::;t ;:;tat0mrnt."

10

POINT IV
THE COl\n\fISSTON ERRED IN FAILING TO
MAKE FINDINGS OR ADOPT CONCLUSIONS FROl\f WHICH ITS THEORY OF LIABILITY COULD BE DETER!\H"t\ED.
The Commission made a finding in this case that A-1
was "covered with workmen's rompensation insurance"
h~r Plaintiff on January 19, 1966. It made no findings or
ronrlusions vvith reference to the receipt of the cancellation notire, the effect of part payment of premium or
as to any Plaintiff eonduct which could be interpreted as
estoppel. Since Plaintiff cannot determine, from the
findings and conclusions, what the Commission's theory
of liability is, Plaintiff is at a severe disadvantage in attempting to present fully the authorities on the issue the
Commission may have found determinative.
Plaintiff has assumed, for this review, that the
Commission roncluded a part payment of premium ext011ds a rompensation policy for a pro rata portion of the
policy year. The law does not, however, contemplate that
the parties must speculate about the theory of liability.
The statutory requirement that findings and conclusions
he stated has no significance if the Commission fails to
<lisclose what it considers to he the disposifr\'e issues.

11

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff clearly filed its cancellation notice at a tinw
when A-1 was two months delinquent in premium pa~-
ment. Plaintiff had statutory right to cancrl anc1 ('X('rcised that right in a manner consistrnt with tllC' imnuancr
policy and the law before the accident occUlT('d whieh is
the basis of this claim. If the Commission has jurisc1i<'tion to order an immrance carrier, and not just the employer, to pay compensation, it has found carrier liability in this case against the lav;r and in abuse of its administrative authority.
Respectfully submitted,

CLYDE, MECHAM & PRArrT
FRANK J. ALLEN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
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